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ABSTRACT 
 
Cryptographic devices with hardware implementation of the algorithms are 
increasingly being used in various applications. As a consequence, there is an increased need 
for security against the attacks on the cryptographic system. Among various attack 
techniques, side channel attacks pose a significant threat to the hardware implementation. 
Power analysis attacks are a type of side channel attack where the power leakage from the 
underlying hardware is used to eavesdrop on the hardware operation. Wave pipelined 
differential and dynamic logic (WDDL) has been found to be an effective countermeasure to 
power analysis. This thesis studies the use of transmission gate based WDDL 
implementation for the differential and dynamic logic. 
Although WDDL is an effective defense against power analysis, the number of gates 
needed for the design of a secure implementation is double the number of gates used for 
non-secure operations.  In this thesis we propose transmission gate based structures for 
implementation of wave pipelined dynamic and differential logic to minimize the overhead 
of this defense against power analysis attacks. A transmission gate WDDL design 
methodology is presented, and the design and analysis of a secure multiplier is given. The 
adder structures are compared in terms of security effectiveness and silicon area overhead 
for three cases: unsecured logic implementation, standard gate WDDL, and transmission 
gate WDDL. In simulation, the transmission gate WDDL design is seen to have similar 
power consumption results compared to the standard gate WDDL; however, the 
transmission gate based circuit uses 10-50% fewer gates compared to the static WDDL.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Cryptographic secure systems form a unique application of information theory and also 
relate to other engineering branches involving communication systems, mathematics, 
software design and circuit design. A central problem for such cryptographic systems is to 
know that they have not been tampered with or replaced by a malicious third party. These 
attacks, also called cryptanalysis attacks, capitalize on the implementation defects inherent in 
any system.   
Technological advances in application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design have had 
a significant impact on the field of cryptography. The needs for increased speed, reduced 
area and reduced cost have resulted in customized implementations of cryptographic 
devices. However, even if the algorithms used are cryptographically secure, their 
implementation may be susceptible to hardware attacks. Furthermore, even if the hardware 
implementation is secure, it may still be susceptible to a number of side-channel attacks, an 
issue of much research. Of these side channel attacks, one specific concern is the power 
analysis attack, which uses power fluctuation information measured during operation to 
extract information out of a cryptographic device. 
 One way of securing the cryptographic systems against these attacks is through software 
countermeasures. However, it has been found that these software countermeasures are not 
completely effective since power leakage is largely dependent on the underlying logic 
architecture and cmos device characteristics [26]. As a result, there is a need to implement 
efficient hardware countermeasures against such attacks at logic architecture level. 
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To address this need, this thesis implements an efficient dual rail logic methodology for 
power analysis prevention at the logic architecture level. Chapter 2, discusses the basics of 
cryptography and power analysis attacks. While Chapter 3 explains the related work done in 
dual-rail logic, Chapter 4 details the implementation of dual rail logic on FPGA. Chapter 5 
proposes the transmission gate-based logic structure. Chapter 6 summarizes results and 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BASICS OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS 
 
 
2.1 Background 
Cryptographic algorithms and protocols form the basis for secure computing and 
communication systems. These algorithms are typically implemented as abstractions, 
resulting in a complete system that targets specific objectives. In such a system, each block is 
assumed to be independently secure, and so the final implementation is also assumed to be 
secure.  
The algorithms and protocols are implemented either as software running on a processor 
or on custom hardware. It is assumed that the hardware used has little or no impact on the 
cryptographic security of the implemented system. In addition, the hardware is assumed to 
be a black box [3], since that the attacker can only look at signals as they enter or leave the 
system. Since internal computations are not revealed to the outside world, the security of the 
system is primarily dependent on the specific algorithm. 
 
2.1.1 Algorithmic security parameters 
Secrecy algorithms can be described as a transformation of one space (i.e. a set of 
possible messages) to another space (a set of possible cryptograms) [1].  Ideally these 
transformations are reversible such that they can be deciphered only with the correct 
decryption key. 
The security of the algorithm is tested by analyzing the one used and its key 
manipulations. The following parameters are typically used to evaluate the strength of the 
secrecy system [1].
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1. Key length 
A cryptographic key is used to encrypt the plain text. Generally, a longer key 
length increases the strength of the implementation; however, it also increases 
the processing overhead. Thus the key length must be small enough to be 
practical while at the same time long enough to ensure security. 
 
2. Secrecy level 
The secrecy level of a security system is defined by the amount of partial 
information needed to compromise the entire system. For some secrecy 
algorithms, partial information is enough to decrypt the cryptogram. However, 
other systems based on only a partial compromise of information will not 
provide a unique solution for the cryptogram. In addition, any increase in 
overhead needed to break the system will ensure a higher the level of security.  
Thus, it is needed for the key length to be small enough to be practical while 
at the same time long enough for the system to be secure. The key length and 
secrecy level for a typical system can be determined by the theoretical analysis. 
 
2.2 Theoretical analysis 
Theoretical analysis of secrecy systems arises from the basic postulates covered in detail 
by Shannon. His communication theory of secrecy systems and the underlying equations 
form basis of secrecy systems and cryptography [1]. Understanding of security requires the 
basic understanding of the mathematical aspects of secrecy systems.  
The mathematical model of a cryptography system can be designed similar to the noisy 
communication system [1]. The message or the transmitted signal is modified through 
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statistical or mathematical properties by a statistically chosen key, which is accomplished 
through encryption. The result is the cryptogram which is analogous to the noisy signal. This 
cryptogram is then used to extract the original signal which can be equated to the extraction 
of the original message free of noise at the receiver. Because of these similarities, we can 
apply the same statistical techniques used in communication theory to build a mathematical 
model and analyze the security of the system. This model helps us in understanding the 
uncertainty associated with the deciphering of the cryptogram.  
 
2.3 Mathematical model  
Let us assume that there are finite message sequences - M1, M2 . . . Mn with apriory 
probabilities P(M1) P(M2) . . . P() resulting in finite number of cryptograms E1, E2..…Em. 
Let Ti be the transformation function used. Then, 
E =  Ti( )M  
The condition for a perfect secrecy system can be derived from Baye’s theorem 
describing the relation between the a priori and posteriori probabilities associated with a 
cryptographic system. Baye’s theorem is given by, 
PE( )M  =  
P( )M PM( )E
P( )E
 
 Where, 
  P (M)     = apriori probability of message M  
  PE( )M   = a posteriori probability of message M if cryptogram E is 
intercepted. 
  PM( )E     = Conditional probability of cryptogram E if message M is chosen 
  P (E)   = Probability of obtaining cryptogram E. 
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The condition for perfect secrecy can be obtained by solving Baye’s theorem with the 
condition that the conditional probability criterion PM( )E  =  P( )E  for all E and M.  
If PM( )E  =  P( )E , then from Baye’s law it is shown by Shannon [1] that, 
PE( )M  = P( )M .  
The encrypted message or the cryptogram is available for analysis and for decryption. 
The cryptanalysis attempts to evaluate a posteriori probability of the message M. In the case 
of side channel attack techniques, the side channel information intercepted will increase the 
posteriori probability of decrypting the message PE( )M  and also the probability of obtaining 
the key used for the encryption.  
 
2.4 Side Channel attack techniques 
An implementation of a mathematically proven cryptographic algorithm does not 
necessarily guarantee the security of a system. Physical implementation presents the attacker 
with important information about the cryptographic information. Numerous side channel 
attack techniques have been defined employing the implementation dependent 
characteristics like time, frequency, power, radiation and acoustics.   
Among these side channel attacks, power analysis attack and its variants pose the biggest 
challenge to the system. The following chapters will introduce the main side channel analysis 
techniques namely timing and power analysis attacks. 
 
2.4.1 Timing attacks 
Timing attacks were first described by Kocher in 1996 and is one of the basic side 
channel attacks [4]. Timing attacks are based on measuring the time taken by the system to 
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perform encryption or decryption processes. The information that is gathered can be further 
used to derive more information of the secret key used. Some of the specialized attacks exist 
for determining Diffe-Hellman exponents and RSA keys [5] [4]. On vulnerable systems, the 
attacks are inexpensive and only need cipher text to execute the attack. 
Cryptosystems often have slightly different delays associated with processing of different 
inputs. This difference in the delays can be measured easily and then used to establish a 
statistical map. This statistical map can then be used to arrive at the probable inputs 
compared to the perfect secrecy system explained in the previous section. The reasons for 
these timing differences include the inherent differences arising from the tplh (time taken for 
propagation from low to high) and tphl (time taken for propagation from low to high) 
differences, rise time and fall time differences in logic devices, performance optimizations in 
software, conditional statements, RAM (Random Access Memory) and cache access hits, and 
processor instructions that are used. It has been shown by Kocher et al that the whole 
cryptographic key can be obtained from a vulnerable system with these variations in timing 
[1]. 
The timing variations are easy to measure and can be analyzed using standard statistical 
methods. The resultant correlation samples can be used to determine the key to certain 
accuracy. This method of attack is explained in detail by Kocher et al [4]. 
The attack can be classified as a signal detection problem [4]. The signal is the timing 
variation which is the desired data and the noise is the inaccuracies in measurement and 
timing variation due to unknown exponent bits. The properties of signal and noise 
determine the number of timing measurements that are needed to obtain the information. 
Simple statistical variation functions can be used to predict the exponent bits. Generally, 
error correction techniques can reduce the number of samples that are needed to obtain the 
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exponent bits, at the cost of increased overhead [7]. Timing attacks can be minimized by 
having customized logic architecture in the critical path with equal timing variations for all 
input combinations. In addition to hardware countermeasures, software countermeasures are 
also possible.  
 
2.4.2 Power analysis 
Power analysis was first proposed by Kocher as a side channel attack technique in 1999 
[6].  This side channel attack has been one of the most widely studied branches on side 
channel attacks. The basic idea behind the power analysis attack is similar to timing attacks 
and is based on the same framework described in Section 2.3 [4]. 
Most of the cryptographic devices involve a processor implementing the cryptographic 
library. The Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) transistor based 
processor and the peripherals are active devices and have dynamic power consumption. 
Power Analysis attacks make use of this principle and try to discover the cryptographic key 
by monitoring the power consumption and using statistical comparisons. 
Of the two types of side channel attack techniques, power analysis attacks can be 
considered as a passive attack. In passive attack techniques, the information about the key is 
gathered without any physical damage to the system under attack as compared to active 
attacks in which some form of damage/tampering is done to the system in examination. 
Since passive side channel attacks do not leave traces of tampering, they are much more 
difficult to detect and prevent.  
Kocher et al described two important variations of power analysis [6].  For both these 
techniques, we need to extract the power consumption of the chip during dynamic working 
conditions. Theoretically, the power consumption can be measured by recording the current 
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that is passing through the resistor connected between the power supply pin and the circuit 
[6].  
There are two important variations of power analysis, simple power analysis (SPA) and 
differential power analysis (DPA). 
1. Simple power analysis 
SPA is a technique in which the power consumption of the circuit under analysis is 
observed and suitable conclusions can be made about the input transitions. Simple power 
analysis can also be used to determine the key information and also information about the 
arithmetic operations of a key.  
SPA can is used to reveal a sequence of microprocessor instructions in the case of 
complete software implementation of the algorithms. The power consumption difference for 
a simple arithmetic operations and higher order computation blocks is noticeable provided 
the measurement systems have a good resolution. Thus, SPA can be used to identify 
permutations, comparisons, multipliers, and exponentiations involved. These operations give 
information about the algorithm and also some information about the inputs for the 
algorithms.  In many public key algorithms involving mathematical operations, most 
common method of exponentiation is to use squaring and multiplication operations. For a 
time efficient implementation, squaring is implemented using a faster separate algorithm 
than general multiplication. The two algorithms have different power signatures thus 
enabling the ability to distinguish each operation in a SPA attack [9]. Similarly various DES 
implementations have different power consumptions during permutation and shifts [9]. 
Also, conditional branches are an additional source of significant power consumption 
differences.  
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Techniques for countering SPA can be easily implemented [10]. Since intermediate keys 
and branching are sources of SPA, they can be avoided as a countermeasure. In some cases, 
balanced branch implementation where the branching is absolutely necessary can be 
implemented. However, the microcode in some microprocessors can cause large operand-
dependent power consumption features. For these systems, even constant execution path 
code can have serious SPA vulnerabilities. 
Most of the hardware implementations of symmetric cryptographic algorithms have 
sufficiently small power consumption variations that such that SPA does not yield key 
material. 
2. Differential power analysis 
DPA builds on the Simple Power analysis by using statistical analysis of the power traces 
collected. In contrast to SPA attack, considerably more traces need to be obtained.  While 
SPA is basically a visual inspection, DPA uses statistical analysis and error correlation 
techniques [9]. The basic idea of DPA stems from differential timing attacks. Similar 
statistical differences are used to obtain information as with the timing attacks.  Since most 
of the hardware systems use CMOS devices as logic elements, the power consumption 
difference between the various transition states can be studied to obtain key information. In 
many ways, DPA attack is more powerful than the SPA attack. 
The technique below gives the skeletal technique for DPA attack as given by [8] [9] [10]. 
Implementation of DPA consists of two phases - data collection and data analysis. Data 
collection for DPA can be done similar to SPA attack by collecting the power consumption 
traces. The following steps explain the technique. The technique is based on known plain 
text, and is categorized as plaintext attack.  
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Initially, N cryptographic operations are carried out and for each iteration, only the 
plaintext input is varied with the key kept constant. For each operation the corresponding 
power trace is obtained. The traces will be compiled into 2 dimensional arrays for simpler 
analysis. Let the power data be designated as Pij where i and j are the indexes to the array. Pij 
is the power value at point i for all time j. The average power is computed using average 
values at each point i, which is given by, 
 
Pj  =  
1
N∑
i = 1
N
  Pij 
.  
The next step is to select a target bit of the output. Let a bit position ‘b’ be the target bit. 
A key dependent function D (Km, C) (where Km is some key information of ‘m’ bits that are 
needed and C is the cipher text) is selected which is known to affect the bit position. A 
hypothesis value consisting of m bits is constructed. Once a hypothesis is constructed, the 
theoretical mean power trace of P′j  is obtained. This power trace can be of two categories. 
One for a bit value resulting in 1 and another resulting in 0. Let the mean curve of the 
second category be P0. This trace is compared with the measured mean power curve 
obtained through the measurements ( Pj ). If there is a difference in the curves more than 
the standard deviation allowed for the noise, then the chosen key bits are correct. Otherwise 
the hypothesis is termed as incorrect and a new hypothesis involving a different bit value is 
constructed and the steps are repeated. There are  2
m
 possible guesses need to be made for 
the worst case hypothesis. 
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If the hypothesis is proved to be right, then the next m bits of the key are used to 
construct the next hypothesis. This process is repeated until sufficient information about the 
key is gathered. 
The DPA can be altered suitably for different cryptographic algorithms. For DES, the 
procedure concentrates on the first S box and the first 6 bits of the secret key [8].  It is seen 
that the public key algorithms have stronger power leakage information because of the 
selective use of crypto-processors. In general, most of the RSA implementations use the 
Chinese reminder theorem which is particularly vulnerable to DPA attacks. Even SPA can 
be used to obtain considerable information about the algorithm and operations [12].  
Various countermeasures can be used against both SPA and DPA attacks. Many of the 
countermeasures make the DPA attack difficult to execute. These countermeasures and 
implementation details are discussed in next chapter.  
One more reason that the differential power analysis (DPA) attack is effective is because 
the attack can reveal the key information with little or no information about the underlying 
algorithm [8] -- even when the algorithm used is proven to be secure. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RELATED WORK 
 
 
3.1.  Countermeasures for Differential Power Analysis 
Various countermeasures have been proposed for DPA and SPA attacks. These 
countermeasures can be broadly classified into two categories. 
1. Software countermeasures 
2. Hardware countermeasures 
 
3.1. 1. Software countermeasures 
Most of the countermeasures that have been suggested address the software aspects of 
the cryptographic system. The software countermeasures can be of three types. The first 
approach is to reduce the signal size as explained by Kocher et al [6].  This technique 
attempts to counter the DPA attacks by implementing a constant execution path and 
balancing the hamming codes associated with the power traces [6]. The hamming weight 
between the power traces can be reduced by having each data and its complement 
combined. This has a disadvantage that it takes up double the number of storage registers. 
Also the register needs to be cleared after each write which increases the computational 
overhead [15]. Thus, even though these techniques make the DPA analysis tougher, an 
attacker with sufficiently large number of samples can still be able to carry out DPA attacks 
on the degraded signal [4]. The signal suppression can also be implemented by introducing a 
high amount of white noise into the system [19][4]. This method increases the number of 
samples needed for the attack. This effectively reduces the signal to noise ration of the 
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cryptographic operation. But the introduction of noise components can be easily 
countered by using various averaging techniques as described in [18].  
Another software based countermeasure approach is to implement Random process 
interrupts (RPI). The idea behind this technique is the fact that power analysis attacks are 
possible because operations being attacked occur at a constant place in time [17]. The 
random interrupts can be of two ways. Either by introducing randomness into timing, or 
execution order [15]. This is sometimes implemented by introducing random delays using 
specialized hardware [21]. Timing shifts do not provide complete defense since an attacker 
can use statistical techniques, such as cross correlation, to realign the power traces. 
Randomizing execution order is implemented by randomly placing dummy instructions 
(NOP) between actual instructions. This, apart from randomizing the time for different 
encryptions, also causes the order of instruction to vary. 
Apart from these, countermeasures are designed to mask the key bit used in the 
encryption process [22]. This method is based on the fact that most of the key symbols used 
in the public key cryptographic system can be mapped into a different subset. Similar 
countermeasures are also proposed for Koblitz curves like random rotation of the key and 
random insertion of redundant symbols (RIRS) [22].   
To be useful, these randomizing techniques have to be extensively used to provide an 
effective countermeasure against various statistical averaging processes and other noise 
removal techniques [15]. 
Another form of countermeasure focuses on the instructions which are of critical 
importance regarding the algorithm implemented. In this technique, some instructions in the 
implementation are replaced by their secure counterparts such that there is no leakage of 
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information from their energy consumption [16]. This technique is implemented on a DES 
system.  
In this technique, the secure instructions are concentrated on 4 important operations in 
DES encryption which are assignment operation, bitwise XOR, shift and indexing 
operations. All operations are not masked -- only the ones that uses the secret key and the 
data that is generated by previous secure operations [16].  
 
Data Initial Permutation 
(L0, R0) = PermuteIP(data) 
Data Initial permutation 
(L0, R0) = PermuteIP(data) 
Key Permutation 
(C0, D0)= permuteK1 (key) 
Key permutation 
(C0, D0)← permuteK1 (key) 
Mth Round 
Left side operation 
Lm=Rm-1 
Mth key operation 
Cm=Rotate (Cm-1,n) 
Dm=Rotate (Dm-1,n) 
Km=permutek2 (Cm,Dm) 
Right side operation 
ER=PermutekE(Rm-1) 
f(Rm-1,K)=S(E(R)(+)Km) 
Rm=Lm-1 (+) f(Rm-1,K) 
Mth Round 
Left side operation 
Lm←Rm-1 
Mth key operation 
Cm←Rotate (Cm-1,n) 
Dm←Rotate (Dm-1,n) 
Km←permutek2 (Cm,Dm) 
Right side operation 
ER←PermutekE(Rm-1) 
f(Rm-1,K) ←S(E(R)(+)Km) 
Rm←Lm-1 (+) f(Rm-1,K) 
Output Inv Permutation 
Output = PermuteIP− 1 (R16, L16)) 
Output Inv permutation 
Output = PermuteIP− 1 (R16, L16)) 
 
Table 3.1 Secure DES implementation from the data obtained from [16]. 
 
From the table 3.1 it can be seen that the secure instructions are substituted only during 
the key permutation and operations in each round. The secure operations also include secure 
assignments replacing normal assignments [16]. The XOR instructions are implemented as 
complementary pre-charged circuits as shown in Fig 3.1. 
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Fig 3.1 XOR gate and its complement [16] 
   
3.1. 2. Hardware countermeasures. 
In contrast to software countermeasures, hardware countermeasures concentrate on the 
gate and logic architecture to counter DPA attacks. This is based on the knowledge that the 
DPA attacks are feasible because of the leakage present in the hardware circuit. Thus the 
fundamental countermeasure has to be implemented in the hardware abstraction. Though 
this countermeasure is simple to understand, there are difficulties involved in the 
implementation. There are two types of hardware countermeasures. In the first approach, 
the power to the cryptographic chip is controlled.  The second countermeasure involves the 
use of alternative logic architectures.  
In the first approach, the power supply is switched to the circuit under test by the use of 
capacitors [23] or external chips [24]. In the approach by A.Shamir in [23], the power to the 
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system is switched using two capacitors C1andC2. Another method involves the use of 
cryptographic circuit to draw power at alternate cycles [24].  Any attempt to make the power 
consumed by a smart card absolutely uniform by changing the physical design is 
unsuccessful because sensitive digital oscilloscopes can capture any non-uniformity and then 
that data can be analyzed to reveal useful information. Also, the attempt to cause every 
instruction executed to switch the same number of gates is very unnatural and requires twice 
as much area and total power consumption, along with slowing down the operation of the 
system. Another method for controlling input power is to use an internal battery to remove 
the external power pins. This would keep attackers from being able to obtain power traces 
without tampering with the card. The downside is that batteries small enough to fit onto a 
chip are expensive and have a short life span. It would not be practical to have easy access to 
the battery because that would mean that a power trace could easily be obtained and then the 
usefulness of the approach is circumvented. To avoid having to replace the battery, it has 
been proposed to use rechargeable batteries. 
The reader could be used to recharge them, but rechargeable batteries of this size cannot 
hold a charge for long amounts of time and thus would have to be recharged at the 
beginning of each use causing an unreasonable charging delay at each use [18]. Also, 
rechargeable batteries will wear out after relatively few charges and then must be replaced. 
In the second approach, different logic architectures are used to counter power analysis 
attacks. The idea behind this is that the DPA attacks stem from the power characteristics of 
the logic circuits. The software countermeasures address the problem at the algorithmic level 
and the switching power models address the problem at the architecture and packaging level. 
Thus there is a need to implement a basic solution which can be implemented at the logic 
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and gate level which is the simplest solution to the problem. The solution can be applied to 
the whole circuit or to the part of the system which is susceptible to power analysis.  
There are different solutions proposed as logic and gate level countermeasures.  Of these 
the current mode logic and dual rail logic are important. 
 
1. Current mode Logic (CML) 
In this type of logic, the circuit draws current continuously from the power supply 
irrespective of the signal transitions and its logic state determined from the path of 
the current [25]. This technique has constant power consumption and perfectly 
draws current from the power supply irrespective of the input and output transitions 
[3].  It has been found that the Dynamic current mode logic (DCML) is faster and 
has low communication noise. But the main drawback is that they suffer from static 
current consumption [3] [25]. In order to implement this technique, special circuit 
techniques to minimize channel length modulation has to be implemented. This 
makes it difficult for the embedded processors to use DMCL as the basic logic gate.  
2. Dual rail logic 
Dual rail logic also called as dynamic and differential logic is based on the concept that 
the following conditions have to be met for a secure circuit. 
1. Constant power consumption for all transitions 
2. Constant load capacitance  
This can be achieved by combining the differential and dynamic logic architectures. This 
architecture charges the capacitance for all the four possible logic transitions (0-0,0-1, 1-0 
and 1-1). The differential logic masks the input value. Power is consumed irrespective of the 
input transitions. However there is still a possibility of differentiating the two main classes. 
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The 0-1 and 1-0 transitions consume power whereas 1-1 and 0-0 do not. Thus the 
algorithmic methods making use of Hamming weight balancing techniques is not entirely 
successful against DPA attacks [26].  
The dynamic logic breaks the input sequence so that there is no difference between the 
1-0 and 1-1 transitions. Independent of the input transitions, power is consumed only when 
the load capacitance charges.  
This logic architecture requires about twice as much space and energy than a standard 
CMOS implementation [26]. Another issue is that since SABL has the pre-charge element of 
dynamic logic, fan-out issues limit the number of gates that can be cascaded together. 
Cascading has to be done by either inserting an inverter between each gate or by alternating 
gates with n pull-down networks with gates having p pull-up networks. The use of inverters 
limit the number of gates that can be cascaded together to the number that can be evaluated 
in one clock period, and only non-inverting logic can be used. The second alternative 
eliminates the disadvantages of the first, but the speed of the circuit will be degraded because 
of the mobility of holes in the p transistor gates. Finally, the use dynamic circuits requires 
extra design effort to ensure correct operation under all circuit conditions including timing 
sequences, charge leakage, and noise sensitivity . 
Wave dynamic differential logic (WDDL) overcomes the issue of dynamic logic gates by 
using static CMOS gates to implement the differential logic. This has an advantage of secure 
logic circuit comparable to the SDDL logic but has a reduced power signature [3]. 
The basic structure of a WDDL gate shown in Fig 3.2 consists of two positive 
complementary gates. One of the gates computes the correct logic where as the second 
complementary gate implements the complement of the output. The complementary gate 
computes the false output by using the complementary gate and the complementary inputs. 
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The proof for this can be given by De Morgan’s theorem as below. Let us assume that A and 
B are the inputs and A and B be the inputs to the compound gate. The outputs are 
denoted by Y and Y .  
AND operation: 
Y = A • B 
Y  =  A • B  
Y  =  A  + B  
Similarly, a WDDL OR gate can be realized as a combination OR-AND gates. 
Thus any logic can be implemented as a combination of AND, OR and inverters. The 
inverted output can be further used for the next cascading logic block. The fig shows the 
implementation of WDDL gates (as a derivation of basic SDDL gate) using static CMOS 
gates.  
 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 
Fig 3.2 Dual rail implementation from the data obtained from [3]. 
 
Both timing and value of the inputs influence the number of switching events. SDDL 
can never achieve input signal independent power consumption. Restricting the problem to 
the conception of a secure version of the and OR operator resolves this. 
Wave dynamic differential logic gates can be constructed by connecting these SDDL 
gates together keeping the complementary structure intact.  
The dual rail logic consists of a compound cell with both the true and complementary 
logic. The use of static CMOS logic in WDDL instead of NMOS logic provides an 
advantage for both ASIC and FPGA implementation. Universal gates are realized based on 
the dual rail principle.  
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In verilog, NOR and NAND gate primitives are used to generate the universal gate logic. 
In order to have a uniform implementation, all the primitives used were two input edge 
triggered logic gate instantiations with default rise and fall times. 
The truth-table for the secure NOR gate is similar to the NOR gate but has both the 
normal and complementary outputs and the outputs are valid only when the pre-charge 
input is high. 
 
A B Pre-charge NOR OR 
0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 0 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
X X 0 0 0 
 
Table 3.2 Truth table for secure dual rail logic comparable with data obtained from [3]. 
 
These universal gates were implemented on Xilinx Spartan 2E board. These modules 
were then used in the development of an exponentiation module using verilog. For the 
verilog fpga implementation, Xilinx Spartan 2E boards were chosen and the Verilog 
implementations were tested on both Icarus compiler [29] and also on the Xilinx ® ISE 8.1i 
[30].  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FPGA IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
This chapter discusses the implementation of a secure multiplier circuit on an FPGA 
(Field Programmable Gate Array) core. As an evaluation circuit, an exponentiation circuit 
using the basic gates and secure gates was implemented on Xilinx Spartan 2E FPGA board. 
The implementation consists of a top level sequential module and a multiplier designed using 
generic and secure methodologies. The evaluation circuits are then compared to obtain the 
area consumption results. 
4.1 Evaluation Circuit 
The multiplier is an 8x8 bit multiplier with AND encoded input bits. This multiplier 
architecture is a carry save array multiplier based on a 16X16 bit multiplier described in 
ISCAS [14]. The multiplier uses AND gates to generate the inputs to adder blocks and the 
carry is propagated to the next stages.  
 
Fig 4.1 Adder implementation. 
+ 
ai 
bi 
Sum i , j 
Carry i , j 
Sum i+1 , j-1 
Carry i , j-1 
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Here the inputs are denoted by ai, bi. The inputs are initially given to an AND gate as 
shown in fig 4.1 which are then fed to the adder circuit. The first level of the multiplier is a 
half adder block and the rest are full adders. The complete architectural diagram of the 
multiplier is shown in Fig 4,2. 
 
Fig 4.2 Multiplier architecture.  
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4.1.1 Exponentiation design  
The exponentiation circuit is comprised of the structural multiplier component and a 
sequential control unit which implements the binary exponentiation algorithm by passing on 
the inputs to the multiplier blocks as shown in fig 4.3. 
In this project, two instances of the multiplier are used. One of the multipliers is for 
normal multiplication, and another is used for the squaring operation. The sequential control 
is implemented as a state machine with three prominent states. 
1. Initialization 
The multiplier blocks are initialized with the appropriate input values such that the 
squared output is the input and multiplier output is 1.  
2. Square and multiply 
The inputs to the Square blocks and multiplier block are passed on depending on the 
exponent bit 1 or 0. 
3. Result stage 
Once all the exponent bits are shifted out, the result is sent to the output port. 
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Fig 4.3 Exponentiation block diagram. 
 
The exponentiation output is of the form modulo 2^8. This is because only the lower 8 
bits of the multiplier and square modules are used for the next cycle of exponentiation. And 
the reminder is nothing but the last 8 bits. The division module can be used to derive 
reminders for values which are not a power of 2. 
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output 
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Exponentiation Output 
Input Exponent 
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4.1.2 Test-bench architecture 
The text bench is designed to pass on the inputs to the differentiator circuit which has 
been instantiated as the unit under test. The test bench consists of an initial block and an 
always block. The initial block initializes the inputs and the control inputs.  Appropriate 
control signals and clock are passed. The clock generation is done using an always block, 
which inverts the clock signal every specified period of time. In this implementation, the 
clock period is 100ns. This is to make sure that the multiplier output is available before the 
start of next clock cycle. The output of the execution of this test bench can be observed via 
display commands or can be stored as a value change dump (vcd) output file to be viewed 
through a wave display tool. 
 
4.1.3 Simulation 
In Xilinx Verilog ISE simulation environment, once the project with the desired name is 
created, the Verilog module is added to the sources list. This Verilog code is checked for 
syntax in the synthesis stage. Once the synthesis is complete, the circuit is implemented. The 
implementation stage consists of floor-planning and placing and routing.    
After successful run of synthesis and Implement stages, the test bench added as another 
source to the project is checked for syntax and a post place and route simulation is done to 
obtain the result display. 
Of the complete exponentiation circuit, we are interested in the structural component of 
the exponentiation which was implemented using static CMOS and WDDL. The top level 
behavioral part just passes on the inputs to the multiplier. This behavioral module cannot be 
considered as the implementation is natively handled by Xilinx. The FPGA implementation 
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gives us a fair idea of the area needed for the static and WDDL implementations for the core 
components in cryptographic chips. 
The size consideration in Xilinx ISE can be estimated using the number of LUTs and 
the slice flip-flops needed for the implementation. The Fig 4.4 shows the utilization 
information for the implementations. 
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Fig 4.4 Plot of FPGA utilizations. 
A comparison of the size is done for both non secure and secure implementations. The 
comparison is based on the actual structural logic and also the number of LUTs needed for 
the implementation. It can be seen that even though the Verilog implementation used 
doubles the number of gates instantiated, the increase in the logic utilization is marginal. 
This is because Xilinx auto routing and mapping will automatically distribute the logic 
uniformly. Hence the actual on-chip utilization of the secure implementation is about 10% 
more than the non secure implementation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WDDL IMPLEMENTATION USING TRANASMISSION GATES 
 
It is seen that the WDDL implementation of the basic gates takes up almost double the 
amount of gates compared to the insecure implementation [26].  This increase in the number 
of gates also increases the area of the cryptographic chip which might be a disadvantage. 
This increase in area prompts the use of alternative gate level logic architecture to replace the 
static gate architecture. In this section, we will introduce the application of transmission gate 
wave pipelined architecture [28] to replace WDDL. 
 
5.1 CMOS Transmission gate 
 The transmission gate is one of the most commonly used structures for most of the 
multiplexer designs and also as logic structures. The basic transmission gate consists of a 
pMOS and nMOS transistors connected in parallel as shown in fig 5.1.  
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Fig 5.1 Transmission gate as switching device. 
The control signal is applied to the gate of the nMOS and the complement ENB  is 
applied to the gate of the pMOS. The bulk of the nMOS and pMOS are connected to 
ground and VDD respectively. The CMOS transmission gate acts as a bi-directional switch 
between the input and the output [27]. The operation of the transmission gate can be 
explained by considering the characteristics of nMOS and pMOS separately.  
The nMOS transistor operation can be analyzed by removing the pMOS from the circuit 
shown in Fig 5.1.  With ENB = 0, the output voltage is 0 irrespective of the input voltage. 
When ENB is 1 and input is high, the nMOS begins to conduct and charges the capacitor to 
VDD.  When the output voltage approaches VDD - Vtn, the nMoS begins to turn off. Thus the 
transmission of logic 1 is degraded. With input voltage low, the nMOS transistor begins to 
conduct and discharges the output to VSS.  
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The pMOS acts in a complementary approach to the nMOS pass transistor. Here, the 
logic level 1 is not degraded but logic 1 is not transmitted accordingly. Table 5.1 summarizes 
the characteristics. 
Device Transmission of  1 Transmission of  0 
NMOS Poor Good 
PMOS Good Poor 
 
Table 5.1 Transmission gate characteristics from data obtained from [13]. 
The ON resistance of the transmission gate for the input between Vtn and Vtp is 
constant. The ON resistance is as shown in Fig 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.2 ON resistance of CMOS transmission gate [From data obtained from [13]. 
Transmission 
gate 
NMOS 
PMOS 
Ron 
Vin 
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Because of the balanced nature, steady ON resistance and the use of complementary 
enable signals, the transmission gate based logic can be used to realize faster circuits with less 
area overhead. 
   
5.2 Dual rail implementation 
The transmission gate based wave pipelined structures have been used to generate high 
speed digital systems with considerable speed and area reductions [28]. The implementation 
of CMOS transmission gates in this thesis uses the circuit structure as a solution for DPA 
resistant logic architecture. 
The transmission gate based logic can be developed using the multiplexer based logic 
structure. Fig 5.3 shows the implementation of the basic gates using Transmission gates.  
 
 
Fig 5.3 AND-NAND and OR-NOR implementation using transmission gates from data 
obtained from [28]. 
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The transmission gate based structure is similar to the WDDL logic, but instead of the 
complementary inputs provided to the false output gate, only one complementary input is 
provided to the false gate. The other complementary gate is given for both the true and false 
gates.  Also the AND-OR gate have the same architecture. It is only the inputs are 
exchanged to get the OR-NOR implementation.  
 Unlike the generic CMOS implementation of WDDL, the transmission gate architecture 
uses multiplexer based XOR gate. In static CMOS, the XOR gate is implemented using 
either basic gates or universal gates.  Using basic gates, XOR can be implemented using the 
relation XOR = A B + A B .  
The WDDL XOR implementation using static CMOS and Transmission gates is shown 
Fig 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 5.4 WDDL XOR implementations using transmission gates from data obtained from 
[28]. 
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5.3 Reference implementation and comparisons 
The transmission gate logic was used to implement a set of full adders which are the 
basic modules of the multiplier and the exponentiation circuit. Full adders were chosen 
because of the simplicity in comparing it with the static CMOS WDDL implementation. The 
number of gates for the adder is sufficient enough to establish the secureness of the circuit 
as they will be repeatedly used in digital logic circuit. Also the basic gates are compared thus 
making sure that any logic implemented using these gates are secure, thus the complete 
circuit.  The implementation of these circuits was done in B2SPICE v5 [11] simulator. The 
Bsim3v3 model MOS transistor library was used for all the implementations on B2SPICE. 
The initial inputs are generated using non ideal voltage sources with the input signals 
having a rise time of 10ns and a fall time of 10ns. The CMOS devices are implemented using 
0.35um technology node. The transistor parameters are obtained from MOSIS website. The 
pMOS – nMOS ration for the static gates was chosen as 2.22 and for the transmission gate 
based design, the ratio was chosen to be 1.7. These values of the ratios are optimized for 
maximum speed, equal tplh and tphl. For the optimization process, the optimum fan-out value 
was determined to be 2. The typical parameters used for the MOS are given in Table 5.2. 
 
 35 
 
 
Table 5.2 CMOS device parameters used. 
 
5.3.1 Comparison of basic gates 
The current consumption plot for the adder using WDDL and transmission gate is 
shown in Fig 5.5 and in Fig. 5.6 respectively. It can be seen that the transition currents for 
the 1-0 and 0-1 are similar for both forms of the secure circuit.  
 
Model = Bsim v3 
Level 8 
Capmod 2 
Mobmod 1 
Tox =7.6e-9 
Xj=1e-7 
Vth0 = -0.66(PMOS) 
Vth0 = 0.51 (nmos) 
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Fig 5.5 Current characteristics of AND-OR gate in WDDL. 
 
Equal current consumption for both 
0-1 and 1-0 transitions in dual rail 
implementation. 
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Fig 5.6 AND –OR characteristics for Transmission Gate wave pipeline. 
 
The current characteristics plot for the non secure implementation in Fig. 5.7 shows that 
the current consumption is not symmetric for the 1-0 and 0-1 transitions. 
 
Equal current consumption for both 
0-1 and 1-0 transitions in dual rail 
implementation. 
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Current is not 
independent of 
input and output
 
Fig 5.7 Non secure current characteristics. 
 
It can be seen from the visual observation that during 1-0 transition, a significant 
amount of current is drawn from the power supply. This is needed to charge the output 
capacitors for output high. But no current is drawn during the 0-1 transition which makes 
the circuit vulnerable to both simple and differential power analysis attacks. In order to 
implement larger circuits using the basic secure gates, a simple design methodology can be 
used. 
5.3.2 Secure design Methodology 
The steps used for the secure design methodology are given below 
1. The desired circuit is realized using generic CMOS gate level schematic. 
2. Each generic gate is replaced by its compound gate equivalent. For both WDDL and 
transmission gate based WDDL, the compound gate consists if AND-OR and OR-
AND pairs. While the generic WDDL uses AND-OR pair to realize the XOR 
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implementation, transmission gate uses the balanced XOR implementation given in 
Fig 5.4. 
3. The gate level circuit is then realized using the NMOS  and PMOS devices 
 
5.3.3 Comparison of full adders 
Using the secure design methodology presented in section 5.4, adder structures were 
simulated in both generic WDDL and transmission gate WDDL architectures in B2SPICE 
simulation environment. The schematic for generic non-secure full adder is shown in Fig 5.8.  
 
 
Fig 5.8 Full adder schematic. 
 
The XOR and XNOR are implemented using generic CMOS gates. The design methodology 
given in section 5.5 was followed to arrive at the logic implementations. For transmission 
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gate based WDDL implementation, XOR implementation given in Fig 5.4 was used. The full 
adder sum implementation using the wave pipelined transmission gates is shown in Fig 5.9   
 
Fig 5.9 SUM implementation using Wave Pipelined Transmission Logic. 
The carry is implemented in the similar way using the basic AND–NAND gates and OR-
NOR gates.  
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Fig 5.10 Current characteristics of transmission gate dual rail full-adder implementation. 
 
The transmission gate current characteristics for the transitions are given in the Table 
5.3. The peak current occurs at the point where the input logic changes the state. The peak 
current is denoted by ∆i. The power consumption is determined by the time taken for the 
output capacitors to charge or discharge. The time taken for the transmission gate dual rail 
logic is also measured and is denoted by ∆t. These measurements are done for each 
transition in the cycle.  
 
 
Current consumption is independent of transitions. 
Equal current is consumed thus resulting in equal 
power consumption. 
 42 
 
Transition/
Parameter 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
∆i (uA) 130.339 130.323 130.054 130.336 130.009 130.052 130.406 130.199 
∆t (us) 4.008 4.053 4.026 3.956 3.93 4.015 4.039 4.007 
 
Table 5.3. Dynamic current characteristics in one cycle.  
 
5.3.4 Statistical comparison 
The statistical comparison can be done by determining the dynamic current 
consumption during the transitions. The power dissipation is not considered as this will be 
averaged out during the DPA analysis. The dynamic current and normalized deviation 
(represented by ND) is given by, 
 NED = 
max − σ
max
 
Where, 
max = maximum value obtained (In this case current) 
σ = Average value of dynamic current 
 
The statistical analysis was done for both generic CMOS based WDDL and transmission 
gate based WDDL. The dynamic current and the normalized deviation for the 
implementations are shown in fig 5.11. 
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Fig 5.11 Statistical comparison. 
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5.3.5 Size comparison 
The table below shows the number of gates required for the implementation of the logic 
circuits using normal, WDDL and TG WDDL. Table 5.4 compares the number of gates 
taken for the implementations.  
Logic 
Implementation 
AND-OR XOR FULL ADDER 
Generic CMOS 6 transistors for each 
gate 
18 MOS transistors 
(6 transistors for 
area optimized logic) 
54 MOS transistors 
(26 transistors for 
area optimized 
circuit) 
WDDL 12 transistors 36 transistors 
(12 transistors for 
optimized XOR-
XNOR pair) 
60 transistors 
TG-WDDL 10 transistors 12 transistors 54 transistors 
 
Table 5.4 Comparison of gates for different logic implementations. 
 
It can be seen from the count for the number of transistors required for transmission 
gate based circuit is half that is needed for WDDL implementation using basic gates. For an 
optimized adder implementation, the reduction is about 10%. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The thesis research included the implementation and testing of transmission gate wave 
pipelined circuits as possible countermeasures to the power analysis attacks. The comparison 
of the transmission gate circuit with the static CMOS (Complementary metal oxide 
semiconductor) implementation showed that the transmission gate based wave pipelined 
circuits have a great potential as a hardware countermeasure. It is seen that the number of 
gates needed for the secure implementations in static CMOS gates require almost double the 
number required for non-secure implementation. The transmission gate based design 
reduces the transistor count by about 10% for optimized implementation and 50% for un-
optimized adder implementations. The reduced number of transistors also means that the 
amounts of routing and metallization requirements are reduced. This reduction will 
considerably decrease the area of the secure cryptographic implementation. 
The transmission gate based design is modular and can be easily implemented using 
existing methodologies for CMOS design. The gate and the architecture is still the CMOS 
implementation which is relevant and current proven technology. This implementation is 
thus suited for large scale ASIC (Application specific integrated circuit) design compared to 
pseudo-NMOS or domino logic previously proposed. The transmission gate based circuits 
can be easily interfaced with static CMOS logic thus eliminating the need for interfacing 
circuitry between secure and non-secure components. 
The transmission gate based design is inherently a multiplexer based design. Because of 
this characteristic, secure LUT implementations can be realized in FPGA without major 
modifications to the hardware. 
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APPENDIX 
CMOS POWER CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 
Complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) digital circuits are the enabling 
technology for communication and cryptographic circuits. Since we are looking at designing 
logic architecture with CMOS gates, a brief idea of the power characteristics of CMOS gates 
is presented in this section. 
CMOS technology provides two types of devices, n type transistors (also called as gates) 
and p-type transistors. The basic structure of a CMOS gate is shown in Fig A.1. The device 
consists of a source and a drain which are lightly doped with impurities on a lightly doped n-
type or a p-type silicon substrate called bulk. A polysilicon layer called the gate is deposited 
between the drain and the source regions.  The drain, source and the gate are connected to 
metal contacts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig A.1 Basic structure of a CMOS gate. 
Source Drain 
Bulk 
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The gate is the control input and affects the flow of the current between the source and 
the drain regions. This results in the formation of a channel which is the conduction path for 
electrons or holes. 
There are two components of power [13] in CMOS that affect the total power 
dissipation in a CMOS circuit. These are, 
1. Static dissipation – Leakage current drawn from the power supply continuously 
2. Dynamic consumption due to 
a. Switching transition current 
b. Charging and discharging of loads 
 
For a CMOS inverter, if the input is 0 then the nMOS is OFF and the pMOS is ON, 
thus driving the output to high or logic state 1 (VDD).  When the input is 1, the associated 
output is 0 or low (VSS). During any state of input, only one transistor is ON and the other 
is not conducting. There is no current path from VDD to VSS through the transistors. Thus 
the quiescent current or the steady state current (Ps) is zero. 
But even when the MOS gate is not conducting, there is a small static dissipation due to 
reverse bias leakage between diffusion regions and the substrate. Also the sub-threshold 
conduction contributes to the static current. The leakage current in the MOS device can be 
described using a diode model. The leakage current is given by  
i0 =  is( )eqV ÷ kT– 1  
Where, 
is = reverse saturation current 
V = Diode voltage 
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q =electronic charge  
k = Boltzmann’s constant 
T = temperature 
 
The static power dissipation is the product of leakage current and the supply voltage. 
The total static power dissipation Ps is given by, 
Ps =  ∑
1
n
  i0× VDD 
Where 
n = number of devices 
The typical static dissipation is considerably less so that it can be easily ignored in normal 
circuits. 
Whenever the output signal changes from 0→ 1 or from 1→ 0, moth n and p transistors 
are on for a short duration of time. Current is also dissipated in the form of charging and 
discharging of output capacitive load. The current spike resulting when both the pMOS and 
nMOS devices are ON is resulting in the short circuit current dissipation. This short circuit 
current depends on the rise and fall times, the load capacitance and the gate design. More 
than the static current dissipation, the implantation of DPA is based on the difference in the 
dynamic current characteristics (both short circuit and load capacitance) of a CMOS circuit.  
It is found that at no load condition the short circuit current dominates. As the rise and 
fall times increase, the short circuit current also increases [13].    
The dynamic power model can be represented that the rise and fall time is comparatively 
lesser than the period of the signal. Let us assume that the square wave input of frequency f. 
Let the average dynamic power dissipated be Pd. Then Pd is given by, 
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Pd  =  
1
tp
  ⌡⌠
0
tp
2
  in( )t Voutdt  +  
1
tp
  ⌡⌠
tp
2
tp
  ip( )t ( )VDD − Vout dt 
Where  
in = nMOS transient current 
ip = pMOS transient current 
If we consider a step input with CL as the load capacitance, we can find [13] that  
Pd = CLV
2
DD fp 
From equations 3.3 and 3.4 it can be seen that the transition is independent of device 
parameters. 
The short circuit dissipation is given by,  
Psc =  Imean× VDD       
For an input waveform with finite rise and fall times, the mean short circuit current in an 
unloaded inverter can be given [13] as  
Imean = 
2
T
  ⌡⌠
t1
t2
  I( )t dt + 
2
T
  ⌡⌠
t2
t3
  I( )t dt  
 
If we can assume that the nMOS and pMOS devices have same β and the behavior is 
symmetrical it is shown [13] that  
Psc = 
β
12
 (VDD – 2Vt) 
3trf
tp
 
 
 
 51 
 
Total power dissipation is the sum of the static and dynamic power consumptions. The 
total power is given by 
Ptotal = Ps  +  Pd + Psc 
This total power dissipation equation can be used to determine the power consumption 
for CMOS circuits. The differential power analysis methods need to consider the dynamic 
power consumption and thus need to consider both dynamic and short circuit current for 
the analysis. The power analysis attacks use the difference in dynamic current consumptions 
inherent in basic CMOS gates. 
In a static CMOS device, every 1→ 0 transition and 0→ 1 transition has a different 
current characteristic. For example, let us consider the AND gate using static CMOS devices 
as shown in Figure A.2. 
 
 
Fig A.2 AND gate using CMOS. 
 52 
 
The current consumption for the 0→ 1 transition is shown in fig A.3. It can be seen that 
similar to the inverter, the current is drawn during the charging of the capacitor and is 
discharged during the complementary output.  
 
 
 
Fig A.3 Typical Current consumption curve for AND gate from data obtained from [13]. 
 
Contrary to the AND gate, OR gate (shown in fig A.4) has a complementary current 
consumption. The current (and hence the power) characteristics of an OR gate is shown in 
fig A.5.  
 
Time 
Current 
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Fig A.4 OR gate using CMOS devices. 
 
 
 54 
 
 
 
Fig A.5 Current consumption for OR gate from the data obtained from [13]. 
 
These current consumptions are inherently different thus making the power analysis 
attacks more feasible to implement. This difference combined with the statistical analysis 
described in chapter 2 form the fundamental factors affecting power analysis attacks. 
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